Apple Dashboard
Wednesday, June 29th, 2005Apple Dashboard is to be considered highly suspicious.
Not only that besides HTML and JavaScript code, it’s possible to call shell scripts and plugins that can contain ANY code
and the “sandbox model” allows it that the author of the (malicious) widget writer can set any security level HE wants when the widget is auto loaded with the Safari webbrowser.
Besides that, a plugin, when requesting files via HTTP,
are very talkative, see below:
GET http://wu.apple.com:80/fq/applewidgets/forex.asp?key=tHisIsApplewidgeTs HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Accept-Language: de-de Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Cookie: DefaultAppleID=username@default.email.address; AppleID=Firstname~US~EN~90884967; ds01=A1967DAB7C7F821FDE4867441 6C7A43BDBC3D5E955CD287571400E 548000BD63; s_vi_qx60x60x7Cucex60 ubwx7Cx7Frqx7C=[CS]v4|4280D6E300 0022F9-A000B5D00000001|42B69199[CE]; myacinfoName=AD7F096AEF86A89BA 57EE6A9A91D9498A99073E0694A9511 2F92FC238E8837D8 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; de-de) AppleWebKit/412 (KHTML, like Gecko) Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: keep-alive Host: wu.apple.com
TODO: reverse engineering of the frameworks to find out
what kind of data is collected and submitted.